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COMMENT ON SHIFFRIN’S THINKER-
BASED APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH 
T.M. Scanlon* 
A constitutionally protected right of freedom of speech is a 
limit on government policies that is deemed necessary to protect 
certain important values. Even among those who believe in 
freedom of speech, and believe that any defensible constitution 
has to include a protection of this kind, there is considerable lack 
of clarity and disagreement about exactly how the relevant 
values are best understood. So one central task of a theory of 
freedom of speech is to offer a clear account of what these values 
are and why we should care about them. The judicial decisions 
that make up the constitutional jurisprudence of a country in 
which freedom of speech is recognized as a constitutional right 
will involve a series of partial answers to these questions. One 
thing that a theory of free speech might try to do is to knit these 
partial answers into a coherent whole. As Shiffrin makes clear at 
the outset of her excellent essay, this is not her task. Her aim, 
rather, is the purely normative one of describing the values that 
really do make speech important and freedom of speech an 
essential ingredient in any defensible constitutional order. 
Any account of the values supporting freedom of speech 
needs to have a certain degree of abstraction. The right to speak 
becomes controversial when there is disagreement about the 
merits of the speech in question, and a defense of the right to 
speak needs to appeal to some value that both sides of this 
disagreement have reason to recognize. For example, people 
may disagree about the merits of speech advocating (or 
opposing) tax cuts, or speech advocating (or opposing) 
anarchism. A policy defending the freedom to speak of various 
partisans to these debates needs to appeal to a value that 
abstracts from these disagreements, such as the value of being 
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able to participate in politics by expressing one’s opinion about 
important questions of public policy. To take an example from 
an adjacent area: people disagree about the merits of various 
forms of religion and religious practice. A policy of tolerance is 
therefore naturally defended by appealing to the more abstract 
value of living according to one’s religious beliefs, whatever 
these may be. 
Shiffrin’s defense of freedom of speech carries this method 
of abstraction to a high level. The value that the right of freedom 
of speech protects is in her view the value of “the free 
development and operation of [one’s] mind.”1 The many 
different things that count as speech and are protected by 
freedom of speech “serve the fundamental function of allowing 
an agent to transmit (or attempt to transmit so far as possible) 
the contents of her mind to others and to externalize her mental 
contents in order to attempt to identify, evaluate, and endorse or 
react given contents as authentically one’s own.”2 Transmission 
and externalization of this kind is essential, Shiffrin argues, to 
the development and exercise of one’s mental abilities. 
She lists a number of other more specific interests that we 
have as thinkers, for which speech is essential. These include: 
  a. A capacity for practical and theoretical thought: 
developing her mental capacities to be receptive of, 
appreciative of, and responsive to reasons and facts in 
practical and theoretical thought, i.e. to be aware of and 
appropriately responsive to the true, the false, and the 
unknown. 
  b. Apprehending the true: believing and understanding 
true things about herself, including the contents of her 
mind, and the features and forces of the environment 
from which she emerges and in which she interacts. 
  c. Exercising the imagination: in addition, rational 
agents have interests in understanding and intellectually 
exploring non-existent possible and impossible 
environments. . . . 
  d. Becoming a distinctive individual: developing a 
personality and engaging more broadly in a mental life 
that, while responsive to reasons and facts, is 
distinguished from others’ personalities by individuating 
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features, emotions, reactions, traits, thoughts, and 
experiences that contribute to a distinctive perspective 
that embodies and represents each individual’s 
separateness as a person. 
  e. Moral agency: acquiring the relevant knowledge 
base and character traits as well as forming the relevant 
thoughts and intentions to comply with the 
requirements of morality. (This interest, of course, may 
already be contained in . . . (a-c)). 
  f. Responding authentically: Pursuing (a-e) through 
processes that represent free and authentic forms of 
internal creation and recognition . . . . 
  g. Living among others: Living among other social, 
autonomous agents who have the opportunities to 
develop their capacities in like ways . . . . 
  h. Appropriate recognition and treatment: being 
recognized by other agents for the person she is and 
having others treat her morally well.3 
These interests are already quite abstract, but Shiffrin’s 
account ties them together and grounds them in the yet broader 
overarching interest in the “development and operation” of 
one’s mind.4 
This account of the basis of freedom of speech has a number 
of advantages. It appeals to a value that everyone is plausibly 
held to share. As Shiffrin says, anyone who values him or herself 
as a thinker must value the conditions necessary to the 
development of his or her mind. Second, it supports a wide range 
of protections. Accounts of freedom of speech that begin with 
the importance of political speech—with the importance of 
participating in politics and gaining information needed to fulfill 
one’s function as a citizen—either leave other forms of 
expression, such as artistic expression, out of the range of 
fundamentally protected speech, or else squeeze them in by 
some ad hoc stretching. By contrast, the value Shiffrin cites 
covers virtually every form of verbal and written expression as 
well as other forms of artistic activity. As she says, her view, 
makes no important distinction, at the foundations, between 
communication about aesthetics, one’s medical condition and 
treatment, one’s regard for another, one’s sensory percep-
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tions, the sense or lack thereof of the existence of a God, or 
one’s political beliefs. All of these communications serve the 
fundamental function of allowing an agent to transmit (or 
attempt to transmit so far as possible) the contents of her 
mind to others and to externalize her mental contents in order 
to attempt to identify, evaluate, and endorse or react given 
contents as authentically one’s own; further, they allow others 
to be granted access to the information necessary to 
appreciate the thinker, on voluntary terms, and to forge a full 
human relation with her.5 
This breadth is an appealing feature. It might have been 
achieved, however, simply by recognizing all of these diverse 
interests as important. Shiffrin’s account has the added feature 
of tying these together as aspects of a unified interest (or closely 
related set of interests). But I have some doubts about how 
much unity there is in fact in her account, and about how much 
of an advantage such unity would be. 
The interests Shiffrin lists are varied, but the emphasis in 
her account is on what might be called self-development. She 
mentions, for example, such things as “developing her mental 
capacities,” “developing a personality,” becoming able to 
comply with the demands of morality, “development of self and 
character,” and “responding authentically.” Of course one has 
interests in the exercise of one’s mental capacities for other 
reasons—for example, one has interests in acquiring true beliefs 
about aspects of the world because these are important for the 
achievement of particular aims that one has. The reasons one 
has to acquire true beliefs about different matters are varied and 
of varying importance, depending on the subject matter in 
question. A theory that tries to account for all of these reasons 
by appeal to our interest in self-development seems to me 
unhelpfully monistic and high-minded. It is like an account of 
the importance of political speech that sees political activity to 
be important because it is essential to the realization of our 
social nature, leaving out our interests in affecting particular 
policies, trying to influence who gets elected, and so on. If we 
read ‘exercise’ in the phrase “develop and exercise one’s mind” 
as allowing for this diversity of interests served by its exercise 
the overall theory is less unified than may first appear. But this 
loss in unity would in my view be a gain, since a theory of free 
speech, if it is to guide us in setting the limits to public policy 
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affecting speech, needs to take account of this diversity of 
interests and their varying degrees of importance. 
Shiffrin’s “thinker-based” theory bears an interesting 
relation to accounts emphasizing interests of speakers, such as an 
interest in being able to influence the opinions of others about 
politics, religion, or some other matter; and to accounts 
emphasizing “audience” interests such as the interest in having 
access to information and opinion about various subjects. Her 
emphasis on speech—on the “fundamental function of allowing 
an agent to transmit (or attempt to transmit so far as possible) 
the contents of [one’s] mind to others” makes Shiffrin’s view 
sound at first like a speaker-based theory.6 But the primary 
interests of speakers in freedom of speech are commonly taken 
to include interests focusing on the effects that one’s expression 
may have on others, such as interests in persuading them of 
certain things, or, at least, making them aware of one’s views. 
Shiffrin’s account is interestingly different, helpfully reminding 
us that speakers also have interests concerned with the 
importance of speech for them. Her list of our interests as 
thinkers also includes things that would have occurred more 
naturally on a list of audience interests, such as one’s interest in 
acquiring true beliefs. All of this is just to say (not something 
that I think Shiffrin would deny) that some of the interests she 
lists are interests in freedom of speech, including the freedom of 
others to speak, at least as much as interests in speech (that is, in 
speaking oneself). 
My own view of freedom of expression recognizes interests 
we have qua speakers, qua audiences, and qua bystanders (that 
is, people who are affected by expression but not as either 
speakers or as audiences who have an interest in receiving the 
message presented).7 So I agree with Shiffrin in rejecting 
accounts that focus only on speaker or audience interests. 
Earlier, I offered a view that, like hers, gave an important 
place to an idea of autonomy, although I thought of the 
autonomy in question as that of audiences.8 The role of 
 
 6. Id. at 295. 
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autonomy in that theory was to provide a rationale for what I 
called the Millian Principle, which Shiffrin discusses. The 
function of this principle was to limit the considerations that can 
be appealed to as possible justifications for laws restricting 
expression. Specifically, it ruled out appeals to harm to 
individuals that consist in their forming false beliefs or to the 
harmful effects of actions that speech would lead people to 
believe they had reason to perform. 
I agree with Shiffrin that this principle is too restrictive. It 
would, for example, undermine perfectly legitimate justifications 
for laws against false advertising. This was among the reasons 
that led me to reject the approach of that early article. It was a 
mistake, I concluded, to base a limit on justifications of laws 
restricting expression on a general idea of autonomy.9 An 
account of freedom of expression needs rather to be based on 
the diverse reasons we have, as potential speakers, audiences, 
and bystanders to want ourselves to have access to means of 
expression or want others to have such access. These reasons 
vary, according to the subject matter being dealt with. An 
account of freedom of expression needs to be sensitive to these 
differences and also to empirical facts about the likely effects of 
granting governments various kinds of regulatory authority. 
This brings me to the question of how one gets, in Shiffrin’s 
view, from an account of the value of speech to an account of the 
content of freedom of speech—that is to say an account of the 
limits this right places on government policies. Looking at the 
matter in the simplest way, one might be tempted to understand 
freedom of speech simply as a limit on governmental power to 
ban speech of certain kinds or to burden it in various ways, such 
as by allowing civil suits for defamation. But this is obviously too 
simple. Freedom of expression also clearly requires the provision 
of some benefits, such as police protection for unpopular 
speakers. It is also compatible with, and can even require, limits 
 
distinguishable elements. It is based upon the Millian Principle, which is absolute but 
serves only to rule out certain justifications for legal restrictions on acts of expression. 
Within the limits set by this principle the whole range of governmental policies affecting 
opportunities for expression, whether by restriction, positive intervention, or failure to 
intervene, are subject to justification and criticism on a number of diverse grounds. First, 
on grounds of whether they reflect an appropriate balancing of the value of certain kinds 
of expression relative to other social goods; second, whether they insure equitable 
distribution of access to means of expression throughout the society; and third, whether 
they are compatible with the recognition of certain special rights, particularly political 
rights.” Id. at 22–23. 
 9. These reasons are explained more fully in Section III of Freedom of Expression 
and Categories of Expression. Scanlon, supra note 7, at 93–100. 
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on competing speech, such as time limits on speeches at public 
meetings. 
Beyond this, however, the values underlying freedom of 
speech will also be promoted by, and even depend on, policies 
that go beyond what freedom of speech itself requires. These 
values can be promoted by such things as public schooling, the 
Freedom of Information Act, longer opening hours of public 
libraries, and public access to the Internet. So one question is to 
what degree freedom of speech requires such things and, to the 
degree that it does not, how the boundaries of what it does 
require are to be drawn. I should say that I am myself uncertain 
how this question is best answered, but it seems an interesting 
question to ask about a proposed theory, particularly one that 
defines the values at stake as broadly as Shiffrin’s does. 
Shiffrin lists three ways in which “legal materials,” in which 
she includes “laws, regulations, court rulings and resolutions,” 
can be inconsistent with valuing the protection of individuals’ 
interest in “the free development and operation of [their] 
minds:” 
(1) the legal materials or the government activity may, on 
their face, ban or attempt to ban the free development and 
operation of a person’s mind or those activities or materials 
necessary for its free development and operation; (2) the 
effect of the legal materials or of the activity may 
objectionably interfere with the free development and 
operation of a person’s mind; (3) the rationale for the 
materials, or the activity, may be inconsistent with valuing this 
protection.10 
Her clause (1) most directly captures the idea that freedom 
of speech limits governmental powers to ban speech. But this 
clause also applies to bans of “activities or materials necessary to 
the free development of one’s mind.” A ban on the education of 
women and girls might count under this heading as a violation of 
freedom of expression. Would a simple failure to provide 
adequate public education to anyone also count? Alternatively, 
perhaps a policy of not providing, or not adequately funding, 
such education would count under (2) as having effects that 
interfere with the free development and operation of citizens’ 
minds. Whether this is so would depend, I guess, on how broadly 
‘interfere with’ is understood. Similar questions arise about a 
policy of not providing materials of the sort required by the 
 
 10. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 287. 
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Freedom of Information Act. This policy would have effects that 
could be held to objectionably interfere with important 
“operations” of citizens’ minds, if not, perhaps, with their 
“development.” And a practice of banning access to important 
documents by classifying them Top Secret might be held to 
violate freedom of speech under (1) by banning “activities or 
materials” needed for the free operation of citizens’ minds. 
Clause (3) is potentially broader. The rationale for not 
providing adequate public education might be that it is safer to 
keep the masses uneducated. Or the rationale might be that it is 
better, and more popular, to keep taxes low than to improve 
education. Either of these rationales would, I would say, be 
inconsistent with (properly) valuing citizens’ interest in the free 
development and operation of their minds. Would one or both 
of them be inconsistent with valuing the protection of this 
interest? Does the question of whether freedom of speech rules 
out such a policy depend on which of these rationales it is based 
on? 
Two kinds of breadth are at issue in these examples. 
Focusing on speech, one question is the degree to which freedom 
of speech requires the positive provision of factors that improve 
citizens’ ability to speak meaningfully, and improve the quality 
of public discussion. Second, moving from speech to thinking, as 
Shiffrin does, government policies that interfere with our ability 
to think well by spreading confusion and disinformation, or 
through more radical means, are clearly objectionable. The 
question, however, is whether this is best put by saying that such 
policies are violations of freedom of speech. 
Here I would note one possible difference between freedom 
of speech and freedom of thought. As I said earlier, an account 
of the protections required by freedom of speech needs to take 
into account the differing weight of the reasons people have to 
want to engage in different forms of expression, such as political 
speech, religious and philosophical debate, and activities such as 
insulting one’s neighbors or issuing commands to one’s criminal 
confederates. Such an account also needs to be sensitive to the 
degrees to which different forms of expression are likely to be 
vulnerable to over-regulation or to partisan constraint if 
governments have the power to restrict them. The fact that all of 
these forms of speech involve the externalization of the contents 
on one’s mind is too general to be a helpful guide. Where 
freedom of thought is concerned, however, things are different. 
We have a strong reason to object to the government’s 
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interfering with the development and operation of our minds. In 
this case the objection is perfectly general, and founded on the 
very general value that Shiffrin emphasizes. 
Shiffrin devotes much of her paper to arguing for the 
importance of speech for the development of our mental 
capacities. So it seems as she is offering an account of freedom of 
speech. But the distinctive and important basis of her argument 
lies in an idea of freedom of thought, and it is not clear that the 
best approach to the latter is the best approach to the former as 
well. 
To reiterate, I am not certain what the correct answer is to 
the questions I have raised about the boundaries of freedom of 
speech. But would be interesting to know how Shiffrin 
understands these boundaries, given the robustness of her 
account of the underlying value. 
 
